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INDIAN LAW

THE INDIAN COMMERCE CLAUSE: THE
REPORTS OF ITS DEATH HAVE BEEN
GREATLY EXAGGERATED
LESTER

I.

J.

MARSTON* AND DAVID

A.

FINK**

INTRODUCTION

The constitutional grant of power to Congress to "regulate
commerce with the Indian Tribes"l has been frequently cited as
a source of the plenary power of Congress over Indian affairs. 2 In
recent times, however, the federal courts have shied away from
opportunities to explore the "negative" implications of that
clause which, by analogy to the interstate and foreign commerce
provisions of the same clause, necessarily flow from the Indian
commerce clause. Rather, the courts have relied upon preemption and other analytic models to gauge the limits of state authority on Indian reservations.
An analytic model based on the negative implications of the
Indian commerce clause has never been foreclosed by the Supreme Court. The Court has merely remarked that such a model
is unnecessary, since existing models give adequate guidance to
* Directing Attorney, California Indian Legal Services (Ukiah Office); Partner, Rapport, Marston & Quesenberry; City Attorney, Willits, California; J.D. 1977 Hastings College of the Law. Mr. Marston was counsel for the tribe in Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v.
Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, No. C-77-2838 RFP (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 1983), rev'd 757
F.2d 1047 (9th Cir. 1985), aff'd per curiam 106 S. Ct. 289 (1985), discussed at length
herein.
** Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1988.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
2. See, e.g., United States v. 43 Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U.S. 188, 194-95 (1876).
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lower courts and are sufficiently sensitive to tribal interests. 3 Although the commerce clause has not been used in recent times
to invalidate state regulation of Indians, the value and efficacy
of such an approach merits consideration in light of the tremendous expansion in the number and variety of commercial activities pursued by tribal entities on tribal lands. The operation of
tribal business enterprises, and the assertion of tribal regulatory
and taxing authority over such businesses, increases the likelihood that such tribal action will conflict with the laws of the
state in which the reservation is located.
Furthermore, the federal government actively encourages
and facilitates such tribal commercial activities in an effort to
promote tribal self-sufficiency.' Tribal business enterprises are
also heavily regulated by Congress, under the authority of the
commerce clause. It seems particularly appropriate therefore,
that the limits on state authority over Indian commerce be defined within a framework which considers not only the special,
quasi-sovereign status of an Indian tribe, but also the provisions
of the Constitution which vest authority over Indian commerce
solely with the federal legislature.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
An examination of the history behind the adoption of the
Indian commerce clause is crucial to an understanding of the
clause and to the effect the framers intended it to have. The
history strongly indicates that the clause was intended to nationalize political and economic relations with the Indian tribes
and preempt state authority over those relations. This central
theme pervades the evolution of the commitment of powers over
Indian affairs to Congress.
A.

INDIAN COMMERCE UNDER THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION

The perceived need for uniform national power to govern
relations and trade with the Indian tribes dates back to the colonial period and is even more firmly grounded on an historical
basis than is national control of interstate or foreign commerce.
3. Ramah Navajo School Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 846 (1982).
4. See infra text accompanying note 107.
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Before the Revolution, both the colonists and the Crown recognized and supported the need for unified national management
of Indian affairs.1I In this vulnerable period of history, given the
hostilities with Great Britain, the United States was particularly
anxious to promote friendly relations with the tribes. At that
time, the tribes were militarily powerful and posed an imminent
threat to the fledgling United States government. 6 Thus, the regulation of relationships with the Indian tribes was as important
to the United States then, as regulation of trade and commerce
with the Soviet Union is today.
Article IX of the Articles of Confederation expressly
granted to Congress "the sole and exclusive right and power of
regulating the trade and managing all affairs with the Indians
not members of any of the states, provided that the legislative
right of any state within its limits be not infringed or violated."7
The uneasy and ambiguous compromise reflected in these
provisos plagued the efficient regulation of Indian affairs
throughout the period of the Articles of Confederation. 8
The competing assertion of state authority over Indian affairs caused a serious deterioration of relations with the Indian
tribes between 1786 and 1787. The potential for Indian war had
seriously escalated in Georgia and North Carolina as a result of
unsuccessful state efforts to manage Indian affairs. 9 In response
to these problems, a committee of the Continental Congress recommended in August 1787 the complete and undivided federal
control over Indian affairs.lo Of primary concern to this committee, were not only the relations between the states and the Indi5. See generally F. Prucha, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMATIVE YEARS, ch. 1
(1962) (discussion of the goals of colonial and imperial Indian policy prior to
independence).
6. See generally id. ch. 2 (discussion of the formation of Indian policy by the Continental Congress under the Articles of Confederation).
7. Articles of Confederation, art. IX.
8. See Committee Report, 33 Js. CONT'L CONGo 454, 457-58 (1787). Three states,
Georgia, North Carolina and New York, claimed power to regulate economic relations
with the tribes, and Georgia even attempted to negotiate a treaty with the tribes during
this period. These states predicated their assertions of state authority on the claim that
Indian tribes within their boundaries were "members" of the state, and therefore, subject to state, not federal, authority. Id.
9. See 34 Js. CONT'L. CONGo 182-83 (1787); 32 Js. CONT'L. CONGo 365-69 (1787); 30 Js.
CONT'L. CONGo 372-74 (1787).
10. Committee Report, 33 Js. CONT'L. CONGo at 458-59.
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ans in general, but also those problems that arose when a state
attempted to govern these relations.l1 The committee emphasized that national "Indian policy" had been directed at such
items as the making of war and peace, the purchase of tribal
lands, the fixing of boundaries between the tribes and the state
governments, and other matters concerning primarily political
relations. 12
11. Id. The committee found that the greatest source of difficulties with the tribes
at that time arose because of misunderstandings concerning the meaning of Article IX of
the Articles of Confederation and because of states' interference with the political relations with the tribes.
[Blut there is another circumstance far more embarrassing,
and that is the clause in the confederation relative to managing all affairs with the Indians, etc., is differently construed by
Congress and the two States within whose limits the said
tribes and disputed lands are. The construction contended for
by those States, if right, appears to the committee, to leave
the federal powers, in this case, a nullity; and to make it totally uncertain on what principle Congress is to interfere between them and the said tribes; The States not only contend
for this construction, but have actually pursued measures in
conformity to it. North Carolina has undertaken to assign land
to the Cherokees, and Georgia has proceeded to treat with the
Creeks concerning peace, lands, and other objects, usually the
principle ones in almost every treaty with the Indians. This
construction appears to the Committee not only to be productive of confusion, disputes and embarrassment in managing affairs with the Independent tribes within the limits of the
States, but by no means the true one.
Id. at 457-58.
12. Id. at 458-59. The committee observed that:
the powers necessary to ... [regulate relations with the Indian tribes] appear to the Committee to be indivisible, and
that the parties to the confederation must have intended to
give them entire to the Union, or to have given them entire to
the State; these powers before the Revolution were possessed
by the King, and exercised by him nor did they interfere with
the legislative right of the colony within its limits; this distinction which was then and may be now taken, may perhaps
serve to explain the proviso, part of the recited clause. The
laws of the State can have no effect upon a tribe of Indians
or their lands within the limits of the State 80 long as that
tribe is independent, and not a member of that State, . .. for
the Indian tribes are justly considered the common friends or
enemies of the United States, and no> particular State can
have an exclusive interest in the management of Affairs with
any of the tribes, except in some uncommon cases.
Id. (emphasis added). As the above quote well illustrates, the committee felt that the
proper interpretation of Article IX of the Articles of Confederation would hold the governance of the political relations with the tribe to be vested in the national government
and not the states, notwithstanding the ambiguous qualifying phrase. The nationaliza-
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The committee concluded that, other than a cession of territory to the United States, which would itself remove the jurisdiction of the states, the only practicable solution was for the
states to accede to exclusive congressional control of Indian affairs with tribes within their boundaries. 13
B.

INCLUSION
CONSTITUTION

OF

THE

INDIAN

COMMERCE

CLAUSE

IN

THE

The problems caused by state intrusions into the area of Indian affairs became of paramount concern to the drafters of the
Constitution. James Madison referred to these problems in his
introduction to the debates in the Constitutional Convention
when he included "treaties and war with the Indians" in his
enumeration of the violations of federal authority under the Articles. 14 At the convention, on August 18, 1787, fifteen days after
the committee's report, Madison suggested that Congress be
given the power to "[r]egulate affairs with the Indians, as well
within as without the limits of the United States."ul Scholars
have noted that the provisions for federal control of interstate
and foreign commerce emerged at different times in the Convention than the Indian commerce clause. 16 The language pertaining
to Indian commerce was not combined with the interstate and
foreign commerce provisions until September 4, 1787. 17 The final
language of the Indian commerce clause, as it appears in the
Constitution, provides simply: "Congress shall have power .
To regulate Commerce . . . with the Indian Tribes .
"18
C.

INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY DOCTRINE- WORCESTER AND WILLIAMS

It is apparent from the foregoing that the regulation of In-

dian commerce historically involved regulation of the political
tion of relations with the tribes could not have been regarded as a radical change, as the
Crown had previously exercised all powers governing relations with the tribes to the exclusion of the colonial governments.
13. Id. at 462.
14. DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (G. Hunt and J.B. Scott eds.,
1920).
15. Id. at 420.
16. See Able, The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional Convention and in Contemporary Comment, 25 MINN. L. REV. 432, 467-68 (1941).
17. Id.
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c1. 3.
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relations with tribal entities whose attributes of sovereignty in
many ways resembled those of foreign nations. Early cases found
the constitutional grant of power to the federal government over
Indian "commerce" to have, consistent with the intent of the
framers, a considerably broad scope. As Chief Justice John Marshall noted, in his opinion in Worcester v. Georgia,19 the powers
given to Congress to make war and peace, to make treaties, and
to regulate commerce with foreign nations, among the several
states, and with the Indian tribes "comprehend all that is required for the regulation of our intercourse with the Indians."2o
The Court in Worcester declared as unconstitutional Georgia laws which infringed on the tribal sovereignty of the Cherokee nation. 21 As Chief Justice Marshall stated, those laws "interfere[d] with, and attempt [ed] to regulate and control the
intercourse with the said Cherokee nation, which, by the said
constitution, belongs exclusively to the [C]ongress of the United
States."22 The Chief Justice also found support from the
supremacy clause, article IV of the Constitution. 23 Marshall argued that the recognition in the Constitution of treaties previously made with the Indians as the "supreme law of the land"
was an explicit recognition of the sovereign status of the tribes. 2'
Read in the broadest possible sense, Worcester stands for
an automatic and absolute exclusion of state law in Indian country, based on Congress's plenary control over Indian "commerce."211 Subsequent cases cite Worcester with approval for the
principle that federal Indian law is supreme, though the Supreme Court has narrowed those instances where state action is
barred.
One hundred and forty-one years later, in Williams v. Lee,2s
the Supreme Court preserved the preemptive effect of the In19. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
20. [d. at 559.
21. [d. at 561. Worcester, a non-Indian, was indicted for violating certain laws im-

posed on those who entered the Cherokee reservation in Georgia. Worcester argued that
these laws had no effect in Indian Country. [d. at 537-40.
22. [d. at 540.
23. U.S. CONST. art. IV.
24. 31 U.S. at 559.
25. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, d. 3.
26. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
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dian commerce clause as interpreted in Worcester. The test for
preemption was restated however, as whether or not a state law
"infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own
laws and be ruled by them."27 The Williams test was to apply
only in cases where there had been no "governing Acts of Congress,"28 specifically acknowledging a constitutional basis for the
preemption of state law. The Court there noted that the principles of Worcester had been modified "over the years," but that
these modifications would only apply to cases where "essential
tribal relations were not involved and where the rights of Indians would not be jeopardized. "29
The decisions in Worcester and Williams were based on the
so-called Indian sovereignty doctrine, which limits state authority over Indians and their land by virtue of the quasi-sovereign
status of Indian tribes. Under this approach, state laws are generally not applicable in Indian country unless Congress, in the
exercise of its plenary power under the Indian commerce clause,
expressly provides that state law will apply.
Although the Williams test appears simple on its face, the
Court provided very little guidance to aid future courts in the
application of the test. At least one commentator has argued
that the Williams test, by analogy to interstate commerce clause
cases, is merely a dormant Indian commerce clause inquiry, requiring a balancing of a state's legitimate interests with the need
for burden-free Indian commerce. 30 When, as in Williams, the
tribe's quasi-sovereign status and the federal policy of Indian
self-determination are factored in, the dormant Indian commerce clause presumes the invalidity of state regulation of reservation activity.31
D.

STATE TAXATION IN INDIAN COUNTRY

Numerous courts have cited the Williams test when assessing the validity and impact of state law within the boundaries of
27. Id. at 220.
28.Id.
29. Id. at 219 (emphasis added).
30. Laurence, The Indian Commerce Clause, 23
31. Id. at 244.
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the reservation 32 and to individual tribal members outside these
boundaries. ss However, when a state seeks to impose its laws,
particularly its tax laws, to persons on the reservation, the Supreme Court has tended to focus on federal preemption doctrine, basing its decisions on the supremacy clause rather than
the Indian sovereignty doctrine or the Indian commerce clause. S4
In McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission,slS the
Supreme Court found that the relevant treaties and federal statutes preempted the state's authority to tax the income of a Navajo woman. 36 Although the Court cited Williams with approval,
it noted that "the trend has been away from the idea of inherent
Indian sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction and towards a
reliance on federal pre-emption."37 According to the McClanahan Court, the Williams test was designed to resolve conflicts
between state and tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians by providing that a state could assert its interest only up to the point
where tribal self-determination was affected. s8 Because McClanahan, in the Court's view, presented a conflict between state and
federal jurisdiction, the tradition of tribal sovereignty was relevant only "as a backdrop against which the applicable treaties
and federal statutes must be read."39
It is important to note, however, that the Arizona statute in
32. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 171 (1973)
(invalidating a state income tax as applied to reservation Indians).
33. See, e.g., Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973) (upholding
state gross receipts tax on ski resort operated by tribe off· reservation on leased land, but
invalidating a use tax on personal property located on-reservation).
34. See Laurence, supra note 30, at 237-38. Laurence argues that preemption is the
favored analysis in taxation cases because of the pervasiveness of federal statutes and
treaties in that area. In support of this proposition, Laurence cites to footnote eight in
the McClanahan case, see infra text accompanying notes 35-47, where the Supreme
Court noted that "in almost all cases, federal treaties and statutes define the boundaries
of federal and state jurisdiction." Laurence, supra note 30, at 249 (quoting McClanahan
v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 n.8 (1973)). Laurence also refers to McClanahan's companion case, Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973), which explains the McClanahan case as one falling within the "special area of state taxation."
Laurence, supra note 30, at 249 (citing Mescalero Apache Tribe, 411 U.s. at 148).
35. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
36. [d. at 165.
37. [d. at 172.
38. [d. at 179. The Court also noted that it was "far from convinced" that state
taxation of Indians, without their consent, could be reconciled with tribal self-determination. [d.
39. 411 U.S. at 172.
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question did not directly conflict with the federallaw,"o but was
nonetheless invalidated by the negative implications of those
federal laws. The Court looked to the Arizona Enabling Act,n
which provided that "nothing [t]herein ... shall preclude the
said State from taxing. . . any lands and other property outside
of an Indian reservation owned or held by an Indian,"42 and
construed the emphasized language as an express state tax immunity for reservation lands and income derived therefrom. 43
Similarly, in their consideration of the Buck Act,H the Court
stated that "it should be obvious that Congress would not have
jealously protected the immunity of reservation Indians from
state income taxes had it thought the States had residual power
to impose such taxes in any event. ""11 The Court's reliance on
the negative implications of these federal enactments further
demonstrates that the "special area of Indian taxation"46 is
uniquely within the province of the federal government,47 and
that the Court will show deference to congressional occupation
of a particular legislative area.
Three years later, in Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes,4s the Court followed McClanahan in invalidating a
state cigarette tax and a personal property tax as applied to tribal members."9 The Court upheld, however, the applicability of
the same cigarette tax as applied to non-Indians who purchased
their cigarettes from on-reservation smoke shops.IIO The Court
found the requirement that the tribe collect the tax from nonIndian purchasers to be a minimal burden which neither frustrated tribal self-governmentll1 nor ran afoul of any congres40. There was no federal law which expressly prohibited Arizona from taxing Indians. The Arizona law attempted to tax the income of all "resident" individuals. ARIZ.
REV. STAT. § 43-102(a) (Supp. 1972-73). Plaintiff had conceded that she was a "resident"
for purposes of the sta~ute. 411 U.S. at 166 n.3.
41. Arizona Enabling Act, Pub. L. 65-219 § 20, 36 Stat. 557, 570 (1910).
42. 411 U.S. at 175-76 (quoting the Arizona Enabling Act, Pub. L. 65-219 § 20, 36
Stat. 557, 570 (1910) (emphasis added).
43.Id.
44. 4 U.S.C. §§ 105-110 (1970).
45. 411 U.S. at 177 (emphasis added).
46. See supra note 38.
47. 411 U.S. at 165.
48. 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
49. [d. at 480-81.
50.Id.
51. Id. at 483 (citing Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219-20 (1959)).
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sional enactments:12 The Court noted that "[w]ithout the simple
expedient of having the [Indian] retailer collect the sales tax
from non-Indian purchasers, it is clear that wholesale violations
of the law by the latter class will go virtually unchecked."~3
In footnote 17 of its opinion, the Moe Court purported to
base its decision on the supremacy clause, rather than upon an
"automatic exemptio[n] 'as a matter of constitutional law' either
under the Commerce Clause or the intergovernmental-immunity
doctrine. "M This footnote should not be seen as a rejection of
commerce clause analysis as applied to state attempts to tax Indians, but rather, should be read as suggesting that the commerce clause cannot "automatically" preempt state law. Arguably, footnote 17 stands for nothing more than the proposition
that commerce clause analysis is appropriate only where
supremacy clause analysis is not determinative. 1I1I
Such a limited reading of footnote 17 was confirmed by the
Court in Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation,~8 where the United States had sought to rely
on footnote 17 to deny Supreme Court jurisdiction over the
state's appeal. lI? In rejecting this challenge, the Court opined
that the government had read too much into the wording of
footnote 17.118 The Court noted that "footnote 17 merely rejects
the stark and rather unhelpful notion that the Commerce Clause
provides an 'automatic exemptio[n] 'as a matter of constitutional law" in such cases. (Emphasis added.) It does not take
52. 425 U.S. at 483.
53. [d. at 482.
54. [d. at 481 n.17.
55. Laurence, supra note 30, at 250. Laurence also proposes that the real issue behind footnote 17 was whether the tribe should be entitled to a direct appeal from the
district court to the Supreme Court. As the law stood at that time, the tribe was only
entitled to a three-judge district court, and a direct appeal to the Supreme Court, if their
challenge to the state statute rested on some basis other than supremacy. Laurence argues that the language of footnote 17 was intended to discourage such appeals. The issue
in now moot, however, since the instances where three-judge courts are required has
been substantially narrowed. [d. See 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970) (repealed 1976). See also 28
U.S.C. § 2284 (1976) (current requirements for three-judge courts).
56. 447 U.S. 134 (1980) (decided together with Washington v. United States, No. 78630, and Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation v. Washington, No. 7860).
57. 447 U.S. at 146-47. The United States appeared as a party to Washington v.
United States, No. 78-630, which was joined with Colville for decision.
58. 447 U.S. at 147.
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that Clause entirely out of play in the field of state regulation of
Indian affairs. "59
In Colville, as in Moe, the Court held the tribe liable to collect the state cigarette tax from its non-Indian customers.60
However, in contrast to Moe, the tribes in Colville had enacted
their own valid tax 61 which they sought to impose on all
smokeshop transactions in order to raise revenue for essential
tribal government programs. 62 The tribes argued that imposition
of the state tax, and the resulting price increase, would deprive
tribal smokeshop of business and was, therefore, an impermissible restraint on Indian commerce in violation of the commerce
clause. 63
As in Moe, the Colville Court found that the tribes had enjoyed a competitive advantage vis-a-vis non-reservation retailers,
which existed only because of the tribe's claimed exemption
from state taxation.6• The Court seemed particularly concerned
that the tax-exempt status of the tribe under federal Indian law
would be used as a commercial 'sword' to draw purchasers from
the surrounding community who would buy elsewhere but for
the claimed exemption from state tax. 65 The purpose of the
Washington statute66 requiring collection of the tax from nonIndian purchasers was declared to be "reasonably designed to
prevent the tribes from marketing their tax exemption to non[Indians] who do not receive significant tribal services and who
would otherwise purchase their cigarettes outside the reservation. "67 The only burden on commerce, the Court reasoned, fell
upon that portion of the market which existed solely because of
the tax exemption and would not affect other portions of the
tribes' commerce. 68
59. Id. at 148 (quoting Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S.
463, 481 n.17 (1976)).
60. 447 U.S. at 159.
61. Id. at 151. The Court noted that no federal law to date had divested the tribe of
its sovereign power to tax. Id. at 152-54.
62. Id. at 154.
63.Id.
64. Id. at 155.
65.Id.
66. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.24.260 (1976); WASH. ADMIN. CODE Y458-20-192 (1977).
67. 447 U.S. at 157.
68. Id.
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In considering the claim by the tribes that the imposition of
the state tax was inconsistent with principles of tribal self-government, the Court looked to the Williams test, and finally suggested the proper inquiry for its application. The Colville Court
noted that the Williams test required a balancing "between the
interests of the Tribes and the Federal Government, on the one
hand, and those of the state, on the other."69
While the Tribes do have an interest in raising
revenues for essential government programs, that
interest is strongest when the revenues are derived from value generated on the reservation by
activities involving the Tribes and when the taxpayer is the recipient of tribal services. The State
also has a legitimate governmental interest in
raising revenues, and that interest is likewise
strongest when the tax is directed at off-reservation value and when the taxpayer is the recipient
of state services. 70
The Court concluded that the marketing of a tax exemption did
not constitute "value generated on the reservation,"71 especially
where the taxpayer was receiving state services, but no tribal
government services. 72
In specific response to the tribes' commerce clause arguments, the Court echoed footnote 17 of Moe, stating that it
could not be "seriously argued" that the Indian commerce clause
automatically barred all state taxation of matters significantly
touching the political and economic interests of the tribes. 73 The
tribes argued, however, that they should at least be granted a
credit by the state for tribal taxes paid by non-Indian purchasers.74 Imposition of the state tax without such a credit would
cause an overlapping of taxes, resulting in a higher price on-reservation as compared to off-reservation, thus placing the tribes
not on an equal footing, but at a competitive disadvantage. 71i
69. ld. at 156.
70. ld. at 156·57.
71. ld. at 155.
72. ld. at 157.
73. ld. (citing Moe v. Confederated Tribes of the Salish and Kootenai, 425 U.S. 463,
481 n.17 (1976)).
74. 447 U.S. at 157.
75.ld.
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While acknowledging that "this argument is not without
force,"76 the Court found that the tribes had "failed to demonstrate that business at the smokeshops would be significantly reduced by a state tax without a credit as compared to a state tax
with a credit."77 Nonetheless, statements following this language
in the Court's opinion strongly indicate that failure to give such
a credit would be an impermissible burden on Indian commerce
if it would deter sales which would occur on the reservation due
to its location and the efforts of the tribe in importing and marketing the cigarettes. 78
E.

THE DUAL BARRIER MODEL

Recent cases have not relied solely upon strict supremacy
clause analysis, marking an apparent end to the trend noted by
the McClanahan Court. Instead, there has been a return to a
Williams-type analysis, which became more workable after the
Colville Court's elucidation of what constitutes "interference
with tribal self-government."79 The Court has now recognized,
based on the Indian commerce clause and the Williams principles, two "independent but related" barriers to the exercise of
state authority over commercial activity on an Indian reservation: state authority may be preempted by federal law or it may
interfere with the tribe's ability to exercise its sovereign
functions. 80
The two barriers are independent because
either, standing alone, can be a sufficient basis
for holding state law inapplicable to activity undertaken on the reservation or by tribal members. They are related, however, in two important
ways. The right of tribal self-government is ultimately dependent on and subject to the broad
power of Congress. Even so, traditional notions of
Indian self-government are so deeply engrained in
our jurisprudence that they have provided an important 'backdrop,' . . . against which vague or
76. [d.
77. [d.
78. [d. at 158.

79. See supra text accompanying notes 69-70.
80. See infra note 81.
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ambiguous federal enactments must always be
measured. 81

Applying the foregoing standards, the Court, in White
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,82 held that federal regulation of Indian logging enterprises preempted a state motor carrier license and use fuel tax as applied to a non-Indian logging
company operating on tribal land. 83 The Court observed that the
pervasive federal regulation of timber harvesting precluded imposition of additional burdens on the tribe's commerce,8' despite
the fact that the legal incidence of the tax fell upon nonIndians. 8Ci
In Ramah Navajo School Board v. Bureau of Revenue of
New Mexico,86 the Court similarly invalidated a gross receipts
tax as applied to a non-Indian construction company which constructed a school on the reservation. 87 The Court found that federal Indian policy, 88 and the regulations governing the construction of Indian schools, left no room for the additional burden
sought to be imposed by New Mexico. 89 The Court observed that
the state did not seek to assess the tax in return for providing
governmental services, since it had specifically withdrawn those
services by declining to take any responsibility for the education
of Indian children,90 and that the services provided to the nonIndian contractor were "not a legitimate justification for a tax
whose ultimate burden falls on the tribal organization."9}
81. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980) (citing McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973» (emphasis added).
82. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
83. [d. at 148.
84. [d.

85. The tax was not levied upon the tribe, but on the non-Indian contractor. 448
U.S. at 137-38. It was nevertheless undisputed that the effect of the tax on tribal revenue
from timber sales would result in the "burden" of the tax being borne by the tribe. [d. at
151.
86. 458 U.S. 832 (1982).
87. [d. at 834.
88. The Court cited numerous federal enactments, including the Indian Financing
Act of 1974, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1543 (1982) and the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-450(n) (1982). The Court particularly relied upon
25 U.S.C. § 450a(c) as a statement of the federal policy of promoting the quality of Indian education. 458 U.S. at 840.
89. 458 U.S. at 841-42.
90. [d. at 843.
91. [d. at 844.
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The Solicitor General, in an amicus brief filed on behalf of
the United States, urged the Court in Ramah to modify their
preemption analysis and rely upon the Indian commerce clause
to hold that on-reservation activities involving a resident tribe
are presumptively beyond the reach of state law. s2 Rather than
reject this approach, the Court merely found it unnecessary to
adopt it, observing that the current preemption analysis was
"sufficiently sensitive" to protect tribal interests. S3 Hence, the
Court relied on preemption analysis in New Mexico v. Mescalero
Apache Tribes. when it found that
[t]he exercise of concurrent [regulatory] jurisdiction by the State would effectively nullify the
Tribe's unquestioned authority to regulate the
use of its resources by members and non-members, interfere with the comprehensive tribal regulatory scheme, and threaten Congress' firm committment to the encouragement of tribal selfsufficiency and economic development. 95
At issue in Mescalero Apache Tribe was the imposition of
New Mexico's fish and game laws to non-Indians on reservation
lands. As a prelude to its preemption analysis, the unanimous
Court undertook to summarize the law, up to that point, of federal preemption as it related to state jurisdiction over Indians.
The Court stated the following general principles:
1) While under some circumstances a State
may exercise concurrent jurisdiction over non-Indians acting on tribal reservations,96 "such authority may be asserted only if not preempted by
the operation of federallaw."s7
2)

Although a State will certainly be without

92. [d. at 845.
93. [d. at 846.

94. 462 U.S. 324 (1983).
95. [d. at 343-44.
96. [d. at 333 (citing Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 153 (1980); Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425
U.S. 463 (1976».
97. 462 U.S. at 333 (citing Ramah Navajo School Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458
U.S. 832 (1982); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 144 (1980);
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219-220 (1959».
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jurisdiction if its authority is pre-empted under
familiar principles of pre-emption, we cautioned
that our prior cases did not limit pre-emption of
state laws affecting Indian tribes to only those
circumstances. 98
3) State jurisdiction is pre-empted by the operation of federal law if it interferes or is incompatible with federal and tribal interests reflected
in federal law, unless the state interests at stake
are sufficient to justify the assertion of state
authority.99
4) The exercise of state authority may also be
barred by an independent barrier-inherent tribal sovereignty-if it 'unlawfully infringe[s] 'on
the right of reservation Indians to make their own
laws and be ruled by them.'lOO
5) Thus, when a tribe undertakes an enterprise under the authority of federal law, an assertion of state authority must be viewed against any
interference with the successful accomplishment
of the federal purpose. 101

Applying the foregoing principles, the Court found that the
federal law which commit to the tribe and the Secretary of the
Interior the responsibility for managing the resources of the reservation, as well as the policies embodied in the Indian Financing Act of 1974,1°2 the Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act of 1974,1°3 and the Indian Reorganization Act of
1934,104 preempted the application of state fish and game law to
non-Indians hunting and fishing on the reservation. The Court
found no overriding justification for the tax since the state did
98. 462 U.S. at 333·34 (emphasis added).
99. Id. at 334 (citing White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 145
(1980».
100. 462 U.S. at 334 n.16 (citing White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S.
136, 142 (1980) (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959».
101. 462 U.S. at 336 (citing White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136,
143 (1980); Ramah Navajo School Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 845 (1982)).
102. 462 U.S. at 335 n.17. See supra note 88.
103. Id.
104. Id. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 461·492 (1982 & Supp. II) (current form of the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934).
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not contribute in any significant respect to the maintenance of
tribal resources nor could the state demonstrate any governmental function it provided in connection with the particular activity of non-members the state sought to regulate. 1011 The loss of
revenue to the state from fish and game licensing fees was found
to be an insufficient justification for concurrent jurisdiction. IDS
As to interference with congressional purpose, the unanimous Court declared:
The assertion of concurrent jurisdiction by
New Mexico ... would also threaten Congress'
overriding objective of encouraging tribal self-government and economic development. The Tribe
has engaged in a concerted and sustained undertaking to develop and manage the reservation's
wildlife and land resources specifically for the
benefit of its members. The project generates
funds for essential tribal services and provides
employment for members who reside on the reservation. This case is thus far removed from those
situations. . . in which the tribal contribution to
an enterprise is de minimus. [citation omitted].
The tribal enterprise in this case clearly involves
"value generated on the reservation by activities
involving the Trib[e]" [citation omitted]. The disruptive effect that would result from the assertion
of concurrent jurisdiction by New Mexico, would
plainly" 'stan[d] as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.' "107

III. OPPORTUNITY MISSED-THE CHEMEHUEVI CASE
One recent case, Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. California
State Board of Equalization,108 presented an opportunity for
105. 462

u.s.

at 341-42.

106. [d. at 342-43.
107. [d. at 341 (citations and footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).

108. No. C-77-2838 RFP (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 1983), Chief Judge Robert F. Peckham
presiding, reu'd 757 F.2d 1047 (9th Cir. 1985), aff'd per curiam 106 S. Ct. 289 (1985). In
an earlier published opinion, the same district court dismissed California's counterclaim
against the Tribe on the ground that it was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immu-
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the federal courts to explore those applications of the Indian
commerce clause expressly reserved by the Supreme Court in
the cases discussed in the previous section. The district court,
however, misconstrued the applicable law. On appeal neither the
Ninth Circuit nor the Supreme Court reached the commerce
clause issues.

A.

FACTS

The Chemehuevi Indian Tribe (Tribe) is a federally recognized Indian tribe, organized under Section 16 of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934109 and governed by a tribal council. In
1976, pursuant to the Indian Reorganization Act,l1O the Tribe
adopted a constitution, which, as subsequently amended, was
approved by the Secretary of the Interior on April 21, 1977.
Under that constitution, the Tribe is vested, inter alia, with the
power to levy taxes and fees. I I I
The Tribe is the beneficial owner of 32,000 acres of land adjacent to Lake Havasu in southeastern California. ll2 In June of
1976, the Tribe sought and obtained from the Department of the
Interior Revolving Loan Fund a loan in the amount of
$1,200,000 for the purpose of purchasing the assets and facilities
of Havasu Landing, Inc., a functioning resort complex located on
the lakeshore and completely within the reservation. ll3 Shortly
thereafter, the Tribe purchased the Landing and began operating the business. At present, the Tribe conducts the following
businesses at or near the resort: a grocery store, including a tribal retail tobacco outlet; a bar; a restaurant; a marina; a boathouse which includes a gas station, a tackle shop, and a tribal
retail tobacco outlet; a campground; a motel; a wildlife program
which includes the sale of fishing licenses; and a joint partnership for the retail sale of mobile homes. 11 •
nity. 492 F. Supp. 55, 61 (N.D. Cal. 1980), alf'd 757 F.2d 1047 (9th Cir. 1985).
109. 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1976).
110. [d.

111. Stipulation of Facts at 2, Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. California State Bd. of
Equalization, No. C-77-2838 RFP (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 1983), rev'd 757 F.2d 1047 (9th
Cir. 1985), alf'd per curiam 106 S.Ct. 289 (1985).
112. Legal title to the land is held in trust by the United States for the benefit of
the Tribe. [d.
113. [d. at 3.
114. [d. at 4-5.
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Subsequently, in May of 1978, the Tribe sought and obtained a further loan for the purpose of constructing a mobile
home park within the reservation. ll5 These loans are secured by
an assignment to the United States of all the assets of both
Havasu Landing and the mobile home park and all the income
derived therefrom now and in the future.1I6
The Tribe enacted a Business and Cigarette Tax Code
which regulates the sale of cigarettes, imposes a tribal cigarette
tax and provides for the licensing of businesses within the exterior boundaries of the reservation. ll7 Prior to this time, the
Tribe had collected, and remitted to the Board of Equalization
(Board) the California tax imposed on the distribution of cigarettes. ll8 On December 17, 1977, the Tribe enacted a detailed
Tribal Retail Tobacco Outlets Ordinance which set forth the
procedures for the operation of a cigarette outlet owned and operated by the Tribe and levied a tribal excise tax upon the
purchase or possession by consumers of cigarettes and other tobacco products. 1I9 On October 15, 1980, the Tribe enacted a new
Use and Cigarette Tax Ordinance in order to fully tax the onreservation sales of cigarettes. The ordinance went into effect on
.January 1, 1981. 120 The Tribe at present imposes a tribal tax at
a rate equivalent to the state cigarette tax.
When the Tribe ceased remitting the state tax to the Board,
the Board took legal action against the Tribe including serving a
"withhold notice" on the Tribe's bank 121 and placing liens on the
Tribe's tangible assets. 122 The Tribe filed an action in the district court to enjoin the Board from enforcing its cigarette tax
law l23 against the Tribe, and the Board counterclaimed for the
amount of taxes allegedly due. The district court dismissed the
115. Supplemental Stipulation of Facts at 5, Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. California
State Bd. of Equalization, No. C-77-2838 RFP (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 1983), rev'd, 757 F.2d
1047 (9th Cir. 1985), aff'd per curiam 106 S. Ct. 289 (1985).
116. Stipulation of Facts at 4; Supplemental Stipulation of Facts at 5-6. These assignments were given pursuant to 25 C.F.R. § 101.13, which requires that security be
posted for Indian loans.
117. Stipulation of Facts at 5.
118. [d. at 6.
119. [d. at 5.
120. Supplemental Stipulation of Facts at 2.
121. Stipulation of Facts at 12-13.
122. [d. at 13.
123. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE §§ 30001-30479 (West 1979 & Supp. 1985).
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counterclaim on the ground that the Tribe, as a sovereign, was
immune from unconsented suit.124 The trial on the issue of the
applicability of the state tax was subsequently held, based upon
a stipulated record.
B.

THE DISTRICT COURT OPINION

The Tribe challenged the tax on several grounds, three of
which are relevant to this discussion: preemption by federal law,
interference with tribal self-government, and as an undue burden which discriminated against Indian commerce in violation of
the "negative implications" of the Indian commerce clause. I211
Although the district court cited the appropriate case law, it
failed, or simply refused, to apply the facts in the stipulated record to the tests set forth in the Supreme Court cases. I2S
1.

Preemption

The Tribe had argued that several factors preempted the
operation of state taxing jurisdiction over non·Indians on the
Reservation. In particular, the Tribe argued that the Indian Financing Act of 1974,127 the Buck Act,128 and the policies underlying these and other acts of Congress affecting Indians,129 preempted the state from imposing its tax. ISO In response, the
district court undertook a discussion of preemption analysis
which included a discussion of the facts and holdings of both
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker I81 and Ramah Nav·
ajo School Board v. Bureau of Revenue. 182 From its reading of
those cases, the district court concluded that the Supreme Court
"has found federal preemption in areas which have been specifi·
cally regulated in a detailed fashion by Congress, or which affect
124. 492 F. Supp. 55, 61 (N.D. Cal. 1980), reu'd on other grounds 757 F.2d 1047 (9th
Cir. 1985).
125. Memorandum and Order at 1-2, Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. California State
Bd. of Equalization, No. C-77-2838 RFP (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 1983), reu'd 757 F.2d 1047
(9th Cir. 1985), aff'd per curiam 106 S. Ct. 189 (1985).
126. [d. at 16-44.
127. [d. at 22.
128. [d. at 26.
129. [d. at 1.
130. [d.
131. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
132. 458 U.S. 836 (1982).

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol16/iss1/13

20

Marston et al.: Indian Law

1986]

INDIAN LAW

225

adversely such a particularized federal plan. However, the Court
has not suggested that such federal preemption exists in the
area involved in the case at bar."133
Instead, the district court looked to Moe v. Confederated
Tribes of the Salish and Kootenai l34 and Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation,m, because
these cases involved cigarette taxes. In its discussion of Colville,
the district court quoted the Supreme Court's language in that
case, which stated that the policies underlying congressional Indian legislation (relied upon by both the tribes in Colville and
the Chemehuevi Tribe) did not go "so far as to grant to tribal
enterprises selling goods an artificial competitive advantage over
all other businesses in a State. "136 Immediately following this
quote, the district court concluded that, on the basis of Moe and
Colville, congressional legislation did not preempt the California
law. 137
In this part of its opinion, the district court did not refer to
the Supreme Court's unambiguous opinion in New Mexico v.
Mescalero Apache Tribe, which stated that the circumstances of
prior cases did not limit preemption to those situations alone. 13s
There was no reason, therefore, to retreat from preemption analysis merely because the Supreme Court had not yet used it in a'
cigarette taxation case. In point of fact, the Supreme Court relied upon these same acts of Congress when they invalidated the
application of New Mexico's fish and game laws on the Mescalero reservation. 139 In Mescalero Apache Tribe, Congress's
overriding objective of encouraging tribal self-government and
economic development prevailed.
Even without the guidance of the Mescalero Apache Tribe
opinion, the district court seemed to ignore its own findings of
fact. The district court found that the price of a carton of cigarettes on the Reservation was approximately thirty cents lower
133. Memorandum and Order at 20.
134. 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
135. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
136. Memorandum and Order at 21 (quoting Washington v. Confederated Tribes of
the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 155 (1980».
137. Memorandum and Order at 21.
138. 462 U.S. 324, 333-34 (1983).
139. [d. at 334-35.
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than off-reservation, and that such a difference did not itself
draw purchasers onto the reservation. 140 Had the district court
applied the language of Colville, which it quoted, it would have
concluded that an exemption from state taxation in this case did
not create "an artificial competitive advantage over all other
businesses in the state."14l The result in Colville should only apply where cigarette purchasers are drawn onto the reservation
for no other reason that a claimed exemption from state tax. In
the absence of a tax-exempt market, the goals of fostering tribal
self-government and economic development recognized in Colville should take precedence over and, as in Mescalero Apache
Tribe, should preempt state authority.
2.

Interference with Tribal Self-Government

The Tribe argued that the imposition of the state tax would
impermissibly infringe upon the Tribe's right of self-government, as set forth in Williams. Imposition of a state tax, in addition to the lawful tax imposed by the Tribe itself, would result
in a rise in the price of cigarettes on the reservation equal to the
amount of the state tax.142 In order to lower the price, and
thereby overcome this competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis other
retailers in the state, the Tribe would be forced to chose either
to reduce its profit or to reduce its tax. In the case of the former,
the Tribe's ability to finance the operation of its primary business enterprise would be impaired. In the latter case, its ability
to provide essential governmental services on the reservation
would be impaired. The district court examined the Williams
test, and the cases which had applied it, concluding that such an
"infringement" test was applicable only where preemption was
clearly not present. The district court took particular notice of
the Colville formula which balances the interests of the tribe
and federal government on the one hand and the interests of the
state on the other. As discussed above, Colville states that the
tribe's interest is strongest when 1) the value being taxed is generated on-reservation by tribal effort and 2) the taxpayer is the
recipient of tribal governmental services. The state interest is
140.
141.
134. 155
142.

Memorandum and Order at 36.
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S.
(1980).
Supplemental Stipulation of Facts at 4.
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strongest when the tax's value is off-reservation and the taxpayer is the recipient of state services. 143
The district court in Chemehuevi examined the state's interest first, finding that the state tax could not be said to be
directed at off-reservation value. 144 Turning to the services provided by the state, the district court noted that the state maintained two miles of reservation road and provided transportation
for reservation children to attend school in Needles, California.145 The school in Needles, as well as the grammar school on
the reservation,146 are supported by federal, state and local monies. The state also provides law enforcement assistance. 147
The Tribe, on the other hand, provides water, sanitation,
law enforcement, road maintenance, fish and wildlife management, housing improvement programs, housing for tribal members, community welfare and recreation, and postal services. 148
"Thus," concluded the district court, "the Tribe, as well as the
State, funds services to those who live on, and visit, the reservation. "149 Even if the state and the Tribe provided an equal
amount of governmental services, then the fact that the value
sought to be taxed in the cigarette sales is on-reservation,1II0
should tip the balance of interests in favor of the Tribe. However, the district court's enumeration of services provided by
each governmental entity indicates that the level of services is
not equal, and that the Tribe is providing the lion's share of
local governmental services. Therefore, under the Williams test,
as modified by Colville, the state tax does infringe upon tribal
self-government.
The district court does not appear to have used the Colville
application of the Williams test. It appears to have relied instead on pre-Colville decisions which applied a more restrictive
version of the Williams test. It also appears to have misconstrued the application of the Colville modification in the one
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

447 U.S. at 157.
Memorandum and Order at 35.
[d. at 37.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 38.
Id. at 35.
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post-Colville Ninth Circuit decision that it discusses.

The first pre-Colville case relied upon by the district court
was Fort Mojave Tribe v. San Bernadino County/lSI in which
the court upheld the imposition of California's possessory interest tax to a non-Indian lessee on the reservation.lIS2 In that case,
the Ninth Circuit decided that the infringement was not serious
enough to invalidate the tax, although it did not examine the
interests of the tribe as required by Colville and subsequent
cases. Because this case did not consider the balancing mandated by Colville, it provided no useful guidance to the district
court in applying that test to the facts in Chemehuevi.
The district court then looked to White Mountain Apache
Tribe v. Arizona/ 1I3 wherein the Ninth Circuit had held that the
imposition of concurrent state jurisdiction over the regulation of
hunting and fishing on the reservation was not violative of the
right to tribal self-government. That case cited Colville for the
proposition that a reduction in tribal revenue caused by concurrent taxing jurisdiction does not violate the right to self-government. I114 Colville stands for no such thing; rather, it points out
that loss of revenue alone is not sufficient to establish infringement and that the court must perform a balancing test to determine whether the state's exercise of concurrent jurisdiction does
infringe upon the tribe's right to self-government. 1 1111 The Colville Court merely held that the right to tribal self-government
does not include the right to market a tax exemption to the detriment of off-reservation businesses. Furthermore, the Supreme
Court dealt with the issue of concurrent regulatory jurisdiction
in Mescalero Apache Tribe and found, in derogation of the
Ninth Circuit, that it did infringe on tribal self-government. The
district court in Chemehuevi took note of this fact in a
footnote. 1116
The only Ninth Circuit case cited by the district court
which actually applied the Colville balancing test was Crow
151. 543 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied 430 U.S. 983 (1977).
152. [d. at 1258.

153. 649 F.2d 1274 (9th Cir. 1981).
154. [d. at 1284.

155. 447 U.S. at 156-57.
156. Memorandum and Order at 46 n.2.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol16/iss1/13

24

Marston et al.: Indian Law

INDIAN LAW

1986]

229

Tribe of Indians v. Montana.lr>7 In Crow Tribe, the Ninth Circuit opined that the fact that state and tribal taxes were imposed on the same activity did not, by itself, preclude the state
from imposing its tax. IllS The court noted, however, that in practice, concurrent jurisdiction forced the tribe to choose between
damaging its commercial venture or foregoing tax revenues altogether. 11l9 After applying the analysis dictated by Colville, the
Crow Tribe court concluded:
In this case, the revenues sought to be taxed
by Montana may ultimately be traced to the
Tribe's mineral resources, a component of the
reservation land itself. This is not a case where
the tribe is simply marketing a tax exemption, as
where the tribes seek to sell tax-free cigarettes to
non-Indians. Any substantial incursion into the
revenues obtained from the sale of the Indian's
land-based wealth cuts to the heart of the
Tribe's ability to sustain itself.180

The statements of the Crow Tribe court clearly follow the
Colville opinion by distinguishing between the marketing of a
tax exemption and value generated by the geographical attributes of the reservation. Recognizing this distinction, the Ninth
Circuit found the state tax to be impermissible. lSI
Although the district court in Chemehuevi purported to follow Ninth Circuit authority in finding the California tax permissible, in fact it fashioned its own unique test to determine
whether the California tax infringed the Chemehuevi Tribe's
right of self-government. The district court's test sought to determine whether "the anticipated reduction of profits/tax revenues from the sales of cigarettes would render the Tribe so destitute as to emasculate its ability to conduct its tribal
government. "lS2
157. 650 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1981), as amended 665 F.2d 1390 (1982), cert. denied,
102 S. Ct. 635 (1981).
158. [d. at 1115.
I 159. [d. at 1116.
160. [d. at 1117 (emphasis added).
161. [d.

162. Memorandum and Order at 40.
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The district court framed the test as whether or not the imposition of state taxing jurisdiction would seriously jeopardize
the Tribe's ability to conduct its tribal government. 163 The district court erred in fashioning such a stringent standard. After
Colville and Moe, the Chemehuevi Tribe only had to prove that
imposition of a double tax would cause some reduction in tribal
revenues which are used to provide essential governmental services. 164 The question is not, as the district court asked, how
much infringement is permissible, but whether there has been
any infringement. Regardless of the standards employed by the
Ninth Circuit before Colville, the Supreme Court has made clear
that, in light of the tradition of tribal sovereignty, states "may
not act" in a manner that infringes on the right of reservation
Indians to "make their own laws and be ruled by them. "165 Even
if one substitutes the language of the Ninth Circuit in Crow
Tribe, the result should be the same. So long as the tribe does
not merely market an exemption from state taxation, but markets a value created by either its land-based resources, including
the location or other geographical attributes of the land, or the
efforts of the tribe by the importation and marketing of goods, a
state tax which infringes upon the tribal right of self-government is impermissible.
3.

Discrimination against Indian Commerce

The Tribe also asserted that imposition of the state tax
would place a multiple tax burden upon transactions occurring
on the reservation and that such a burden operates to reduce the
number of cigarette transactions on the reservation. The Tribe
argued that the state's failure to give credit for taxes paid to
reservation purchasers, while affording such a credit to purchasers from other states, explicitly discriminates against Indian
commerce and violates the negative implications of the Indian
commerce clause.
The district court refused to examine the validity of the
Tribe's commerce clause arguments, observing that the Supreme
163. [d.

164. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S.
134, 158 (1980).
165. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
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Court had never relied upon dormant commerce clause analysis
in any case involving Indian commerce. 166 The court did discuss,
however, whether the state should afford a credit to purchasers
for tribal taxes paid, since any actual reduction in sales would
also be pertinent to the infringement analysis discussed above.
As discussed above, the Supreme Court in Colville was
faced with a similar argument. However, in that case, the Court
found that a burden fell only upon that portion of tribal commerce which existed solely because of a claimed exemption from
state tax. 167 Referring to Colville, the district court noted:
Colville did not resolve the crucial issue of
double taxation, although it did hold that the
state need not afford the purchaser a tax credit
for tribal taxes when the tribe is marketing only a
tax exemption. The Court stated that the argument that the tribe would be placed at an impermissible competitive disadvantage by the overlap
of state and tribal taxation "is not without force,"
(citation omitted), but found that the tribe had
failed to demonstrate in that case that their business would have been reduced by a state tax without a credit as opposed to a state tax with a
credit. 168

The district court then quoted Colville directly:
[W]e cannot infer on the present record that by
failing to give a credit Washington impermissibly
taxes reservation value by deterring sales that, if
credit were given, would occur on the reservation
because of its location and because of the efforts
of the tribes in importing and marketing the
cigarettes. lee

Applying the facts of the Chemehuevi case to the language
of the foregoing quote would seem to mandate such a credit. The
district court found not only that the Tribe was marketing much
166.
167.
168.
169.

Memorandum and Order at 41.
Colville, 447 U.S. at 157.
Memorandum and Order at 29-30 (emphasis in original).
[d. at 30 (emphasis added).
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more than a tax exemption,l7O but acknowledged empirical evidence presented by the Tribe that thirty-eight percent of nonresident cigarette purchasers would buy fewer cigarettes if the
price were increased by the amount of the state tax. l7l Unlike
Colville, where tribe members sold cigarettes from trailers
parked on reservation lands, the Chemehuevi operate a substantial commercial enterprise which draws visitors onto the reservation for reasons other than to buy cigarettes. 172 It is reasonable
to infer that if, as the district court found, the price of a carton
of cigarettes on-reservation is within thirty cents of the price offreservation, then customers on the reservation would be completely unaware of a state tax exemption. Applying the Colville
language, if sales due to the "location" of the reservation, and to
the Tribe's "efforts ... in importing and marketing the cigarettes," are deterred, then failure to grant a credit becomes
"impermissible."173
Nevertheless, the district court concluded that the Tribe
was not entitled to a credit. The court noted that California
granted such a credit pursuant to a Multi-State Tax Compact. l74
Under the Compact, California gave full credit to purchasers
who paid sales and use taxes to other member-states. 176 The
Tribe was clearly not a member of the Compact, and could not
be because the Compact was between states and Indian tribes
"are not of equal status to state governments."176 Therefore, the
Tribe was not entitled to a credit.
170. [d. at 35.

171. [d. at 39. See infra note 211.
172. The nearest cigarette retailer in California is in Needles, 40 miles away. Thus,
there is no significant competition between the Tribe and California retailers. The Tribe
does compete directly with retailers in Havasu City, Arizona, four miles across the lake,
whose cigarettes bear only a four percent sales tax (California's Sales Tax is six percent).
The Chemehuevi Tribe's biggest competition, however, is the Colorado River Indian
Tribe, located in Arizona. Since the incidence of the Arizona Sales Tax falls upon the
tribe, and the tribe is exempt from paying the tax under The Buck Act, 4 U.S.C. §§ 105110 (1982), the Colorado River Indians can sell their cigarettes totally free from state
tax. See Declaration of Pamela Williams in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment, Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. California State Bd. of Equalization, No. C-772838 RFP (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 1983).
173. Colville, 447 U.S. at 158.
174. [d. at 42 (referring to CAL. REV. & TAX CODE §§ 38001-38021 (West 1979 &
Supp. 1986». See also Memorandum and Order at 47 n.6 (district court's interpretation
of the Compact).
175. Memorandum and Order at 42.
176. [d. at 43.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol16/iss1/13

28

Marston et al.: Indian Law

1986]

INDIAN LAW

233

The Tribe had also argued that, if it were forced to participate in California's statutory tax scheme, then it was also entitled to participate in the revenue sharing plan that went with
it.I77 Under this scheme, a portion of the state cigarette tax revenues are returned to local city and county governments. I78 The
obvious purpose of this provision is to provide revenue to local
governments as a disincentive to enact their own local cigarette
tax. California has never made disbursements to the tribe pursuant to these provisions, despite the fact that the tribe provides
local governmental services.179 Permitting California to impose
its full tax without an identical rebate, the Tribe argued, discriminates against the tribe as a provider of local services_ and
would violate the Indian commerce clause. The district court responded that it "perceive[d] no argument which would persuade
us that the Tribe, merely because it does provide some seryices
to visitors from across the state,should equitably share in the
fund. Indian tribes are simply not the equivalent of state or local
governments."180 The court held that failure to include the Tribe
in the revenue sharing plan did not discriminate against Indian
commerce in violation of the Indian commerce clause. I81
The district court did not address a third argument made
by the Tribe that the California tax was discriminatory. Under
the California statutory scheme, a tax is levied on the purchaser
of "untaxed cigarettes" for their use and consumption within the
state. I82 However, the administrative regulations which interpret
this statute provide for a blanket exemption from the cigarette
tax for anyone who brings no more than four hundred cigarettes
(two cartons) into the state.183 The state does not exempt from
tax cigarettes purchased on the reservation, thereby making
sales by in-state Indian tribes the only transactions in which
purchasers who buy and transport their own cigarettes would be
required to pay the tax on purchases of less than two cartons of
cigarettes. On appeal from the district court, the Ninth Circuit
commented that it was unclear whether "such a tax could sur177. Id. at 41.
17S. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 30462 (West 1979).
179. Memorandum and Order at S.
ISO. Id. at 42 (emphasis added).
181. [d.

1S2. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE §§ 30005, 30008, 30009, 30107 (West 1979).
183. 18 CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 4091 (1972); CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 30106 (West 1979).
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vive constitutional scrutiny,"184 although the court found it unnecessary to resolve the issue. 185
The most curious aspect of the district court's holding, that
the California taxing scheme did not violate the Indian commerce clause, is the total and complete absence of a constitutional analysis to support it. The district court in Chemehuevi
was not incorrect when it noted that the Supreme Court had
never "relied upon" commerce clause analysis in an Indian commerce case. 186 However, the validity of such an analysis has
never been foreclosed. Rather, the Court has merely found it
more convenient to apply preemption analysis. Certain fact situations, such as that in Chemehuevi, are difficult to analyze
under principles of preemption and may be more readily examined using the commerce clause.
IV. SUGGESTED MODEL OF COMMERCE CLAUSE
ANALYSIS
As the basis for Congress's plenary control over interstate,
foreign and Indian commerce, the commerce clause has played a
unique and prominent role in constitutional law. The history of
the inclusion of this clause in our Constitution demonstrates
that it was intended to keep the states from acting independently to discriminate against certain types of trade or to otherwise inhibit commerce. 187 In modern times, the Supreme Court
has allowed the states to protect their legitimate interests so
long as they do not interfere with, or otherwise burden, interstate and foreign commerce.
A.

COMMERCE CLAUSE ANALYSIS IN THE INDIAN CONTEXT

Chief Justice Marshall took the intent of the framers into
account in his landmark opinion in Worcester v. Georgia/ 88
when he stated that Indian affairs were within the exclusive con184. Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. California State Bd. of Equalization, 757 F.2d
1047, 1057 n.13 (9th Cir. 1985).
185. [d.
186. Memorandum and Order at 41.
187. See supra text accompanying notes 5-13.
188. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
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trol of the federal government. 18S In modern times, under much
different circumstances, the Supreme Court has qualified this
holding. Yet the Court has not overruled Worcester and has continued to protect the principles for which it stands. Rather, the
Court has said that the commerce clause may be invoked to prevent undue discrimination against Indian commerce/so especially where preemption analysis does not suggest a clear result.
The Supreme Court has gone so far as to suggest a situation
where commerce clause analysis would be appropriate. In Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,l9l an Indian tribal tax on gas and
oil production was challenged by non-Indians lessees as violative
of the commerce clause. The Supreme Court found that the tax
did not discriminate against interstate commerce since the tax
was fairly apportioned, that is, the tax was fairly related to- the
amount of the activity occurring on the reservation and to the
services provided by the tribe. ls2 The Court went on to state
however, that a state tax applied to on-reservation activity could
be invalid under the commerce clause.
[W]hen the activity taxed by the Tribe occurs entirely on tribal lands, the multiple taxation issue
would arise only if a State attempted to levy a tax
on the same activity, which is more than the
State's contact with the activity would justify. In
such a circumstance, any challenge asserting that
tribal and state taxes create a multiple burden on
interstate commerce should be directed at the
state tax which, in the absence of congressional
ratification, might be invalidated under the Commerce Clause. ls3

This quote illustrates rather clearly the continued validity of
commerce clause analysis in the area of Indian affairs. Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that there are significant differences
between interstate and Indian commerce.
189.
190.
134, 157
191.
192.
193.

See supra text accompanying note 22.
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S.
(1980).
455 U.S. 130 (1982).
Id. at 156-58 and nn.23, 26.
Id. at 158 n.26 (emphasis in original).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1986

31

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [1986], Art. 13

236

B.

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16:205

SPECIAL FEATURES OF INDIAN COMMERCE

Although, in certain instances, analogies between interstate
and Indian commerce may be appropriate, there are unique and
vital considerations that come into play when Indian commerce
is in issue. Indian commerce, unlike interstate commerce, must
be viewed within the context of the special trust relationship
which exists between Indian tribes and the federal government.
It also must be considered within the context of the express congressional policy of encouraging Indian self-government and economic self-sufficiency/9' for without a free and uninhibited flow
of commerce between Indian tribes and non-Indians, these goals
cannot be achieved.
The interest of the federal government in regulating interstate commerce is primarily economic in nature. The purpose of
federal control over interstate commerce is to prevent anyone
state from inhibiting the flow flow of trade between the states,191)
but the government does not seek to control the political relations amongst the states with the interstate commerce clause.
Regulation of Indian commerce, on the other hand, has historically involved regulation of the political relationships with entities who possess attributes of sovereignty and hence, in certain
ways, resemble foreign nations. 1ge This distinction was clearly
recognized by the framers when they included Indian tribes in
the commerce clause. 197 Non-uniform state regulation and taxation in the area of Indian commerce would tend to disrupt federal Indian policy, no less than in the area of foreign commerce.
The existence of comprehensive federal policies concerning the
political relations with foreign nations and with Indian tribes
suggests that it would be more useful to examine Supreme Court
authority in the area of foreign commerce for an appropriate analytic model.
A suitable model of foreign commerce clause analysis ap194. See, e.g., The Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1543 (1982 & Supp.
See also Ramah Navajo School Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 839-40
(1982) (discussion of federal policies encouraging the development of tribal education).
195. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1979).
196. See F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, ch. 3, sec. B., ch. 4, sec. Al
(1982).
197. See supra text accompanying notes 9-14.

11).
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pears in Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles/9s wherein
the Supreme Court was faced with the applicability of California's ad valorem property taxes to cargo containers located
within the state which were owned by a Japanese company and
used in foreign commerce. 199 The state had argued that the services it provided while the containers were within the state, such
as fire and police protection, justified the imposition of the
tax. 200 The Court found that, had it been an interstate commerce situation, the state tax would have been valid. However,
because of the special nature of foreign commerce, the Court
noted that a more extensive constitutional inquiry was required. 201 The Court applied a six-step test to determine
whether a state tax placed an impermissible burden on commerce. If the activity sought to be taxed 1) lacks a substantial
nexus with the taxing state; 2) is not fairly apportioned; 3) discriminates against [foreign] commerce; 4) is not fairly related to
the services provided by the state;202 5) creates a substantial risk
of multiple taxation, apportionment notwithstanding; and 6)
prevents the federal government from speaking with one voice in
regulating commercial relations with foreign governments, then
such a tax is impermissible under the Constitution. 203
The first four elements, which form the test for whether a
state tax impermissibly burdens interstate commerce,204 were
met by the state. The Court held, however, that failure to meet
either of the additional tests rendered the tax repugnant to the
commerce clause and therefore invalid. 20G Such additional tests
were mandated by the need to prevent "a double tax burden to
which [domestic] commerce is not exposed, and which the commerce clause forbids"206 and to maintain uniformity in an area
of national concern. 207
A similar set of concerns exists in the area-of Indian com198. 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
199. [d. at 444.

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

[d. at 445.
[d. at 446.
[d. at 444-45 (citing Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977)).
441 U.S. at 451.
See Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
441 U.S. at 451.
[d. at 448.
[d. at 448-49.
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merce. The Constitution vests the federal government with the
power to regulate intercourse with the Indian tribes,208 and it
has done so in a comprehensive manner. The oft-cited policies of
encouraging tribal self-government and economic self-sufficiency
are firmly imbedded in congressional legislation,209 and are as
worthy of protection as federal policies regarding trade with foreign nations. These policies apply to all tribes, regardless of the
state in which they are located. Allowing a state to interfere with
the purpose or uniform effect of these policies would be inconsistent with Congress's power to "regulate Commerce ... with the
Indian tribes."21o In addition, as in foreign commerce, dual tax
burdens can be particularly dangerous since they can impair, or
destroy, commerce between the taxing entities. The nature of
tribal economies makes this a particularly acute problem in the
Indian commerce context. For example, in the Chemehuevi case,
the bulk of the revenues of the Tribe are not generated through
transactions between the Tribe and its own members, but
through transactions between the Tribe and non-members who
are, for the most part, non-Indians residing off the reservation.:m It therefore becomes critical for the development and enhancement of the reservation economy that these transactions
are not subjected to any state action which could stymie the
Tribe's efforts to generate revenue and provide essential governmental services.

C.

ApPLICATION OF THE JAPAN LINE, LTD. TEST

The utility of the Japan Line, Ltd. test may be demonstrated by analysing the facts of the Chemehuevi case under
each of the six steps.
208. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
209. See, e.g., The Indian Financing Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1543 (1982 & Supp. II).
210. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
211. In September 1981, the Tribe commissioned the Survey Research Center at the
University of California at Berkeley to design and conduct a survey to determine the
effect of imposing California's cigarette tax on sales of cigarettes sold and taxed by the
Tribe on their reservation. Supplemental Stipulation of Facts at 3. The district court
used the results of this survey in making its determination. The survey results showed
that over 75'}(. of the cigarette transactions were between non-residents and the Tribe.
Declaration of Robert Posner at 6-7, Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. California State Bd. of
Equalization, No. C-77-2838 RFP (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 1983).
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Nexus

Cigarettes purchased and consumed on the Chemehuevi
Reservation are also purchased and consumed within the borders of the state of California. A significant number of purchasers are California residents who would likely consume the cigarettes purchased on the reservation elsewhere within the state.
Thus, there is clearly a nexus between the activity to be taxed
and the taxing entity.

2.

Apportionment

This test is of fundamental importance to any commerce
clause analysis. As the Court in Japan Line, Ltd. said:
It is a commonplace of constitutional jurisprudence that multiple taxation may well be offensive to the Commerce Clause. In order to prevent
multiple taxation of interstate commerce, this
Court has required that taxes be apportioned
among taxing jurisdictions, so that no instrumentality of commerce is subjected to more than one
tax on its full value.212

In this case, the state seeks to tax the full value of the privilege of importing, marketing and using cigarettes within the
state. Since the Tribe also seeks to tax this full value, a dual tax
burden on cigarette sales is created. Ordinarily, the state apportions its tax by granting a credit to purchasers for use taxes paid
to other states. The state has refused, however, to grant tribal
purchasers a similar credit for tribal taxes paid. Thus, in
Chemehuevi, the state has not apportioned its tax.

3.

Discrimination

The state tax here discriminates against Indian cigarette
sales as opposed to interstate or intrastate sales. In the case of
intrastate sales, the state tax alone applies. If the sale is interstate, then the purchaser is given credit for the amount of taxes
paid to the state in which they purchased the cigarettes, pro212. 441 U.S. at 446-47 (citations omitted).
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vided that state is a member of the Multi-State Tax Compact.
In any event, out-of-state purchasers of four hundred cigarettes
or less (two cartons) are exempt from the California tax. The
state does not grant such a credit to tribal sales, thus these sales
are taxed twice: once by the tribe and again by the state. This
increases the price and deters consumers from purchasing cigarettes on the reservation.
The Supreme Court's language in Colville should be taken
into account here. To wit, if the purchases which are deterred by
the imposition of the state tax exist solely because the tribe is
marketing, or, presumably, purchasers are seeking, an exemption
from state taxation, such discrimination is permissible. If, however, sales are deterred which "would occur on the reservation
because of its location and because of the efforts of the Tribes in
importing and marketing the cigarettes,"1I13 then such discrimination is impermissible. The district court found that the tribe
was marketing more than a tax exemption. 214 Therefore, the
state tax is discriminatory.
4.

Relation to State Services

Although the state does provide some services to the reservation, they are only tangentially related, both in scope and
amount, to the use and consumption of cigarettes. The state
provides roads leading to, and two miles within, the reservation,
which allow visitors and residents access to the reservation.21Ii
The state also provides, in conjunction with federal and local
governments, funds for the operation of schools for reservation
children, and provides transportation to the school outside the
reservation. 218 Of the revenue it collects from its cigarette tax,
the state returns thirty percent to local governments.217 Under
the current statutory scheme, none of these monies are distributed to the Tribe. 218 Thus, although the maintenance of roads
allow potential cigarette purchasers to reach the fringes of the
213. 447 u.s. at 158.
214. Memorandum and Order at 35-36.
215. [d. at 37; Supplemental Stipulation of Facts at 3.
216. Memorandum and Order at 37.
217. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 30462 (West 1979). These funds are not required to be
used for any purpose. although they may be used for the general welfare of the state. [d.
218. Supplemental Stipulation of Facts at 2.
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reservation, there is no evidence to suggest that state cigarette
tax revenues are ever used to maintain those roads, nor to pay
the operating expenses of local schools. Furthermore, these services form only the smallest part of the value which might be
generated by the privilege of using cigarettes within the state.
Therefore, the state cigarette tax can be said to not be fairly
related to the services provided to the Tribe.
5.

Risk of Multiple Taxation

Unlike in Japan Line, Ltd., the risk of multiple taxation
can be completely eliminated by apportionment. In Japan Line,
Ltd., there was no qualified tribunal which could apportion the
taxes between a state and a foreign government, nor could the
Court control whether or not a foreign nation taxed the full
value. 219 Here, a court would have the benefit of comprehensive
federal regulation of Indian tribes and would have the power to
apportion taxes between the Tribe and the state in accord with
the preeminent federal scheme. Furthermore, any multiple tax
burden could be eliminated if the state granted the Tribe a
credit similar to the one it grants sister states. If no credit is
given then multiple taxation is virtually guaranteed.
6.

Uniformity of Federal Regulation

There is sufficient evidence to support a finding that the reduction in reservation sales which would result from the imposition of the state tax on top of the tribal tax would impair the
Tribe's ability to be economically self-sufficient and to provide
essential government services on the reservation. 220 The imposition of the state tax interferes with the successful accomplishment of the federal purpose 221 and is contrary to federal policy.
Allowing the tax to stand would be inconsistent with the plenary
power of Congress to regulate Indian commerce, and would
threaten Congress's overriding objective that all tribes attain ec219. 441 U.S. at 454-55.
220. The survey found that 55% of resident and 38% of non·resident purchasers
would buy fewer cigarettes if the price were raised by the amount of the California tax.
Declaration of Robert Posner at 6-7. This constitutes a substantial portion of the Tribe's
business.
221. See New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 336 (1983).
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onomic independence. Such interference would therefore affect
the uniform application of federal Indian policy.
.

D.

EVALUATION

The foregoing application of a commerce clause analysis is
not only consistent with preemption and infringement analysis,
but provides an easier framework for application by the courts.
Such an analysis weighs the legitimate interests of the tribal,
state and federal governments as suggested by Colville, yet fortifies federal control over Indian affairs by grounding it in the specific constitutional dictates of the Indian commerce clause. Such
an analysis seems particularly appropriate when the commercial
activities of Indian tribes are in issue.

v.

CONCLUSION

The Ninth Circuit, on appeal from the district court, failed
to reach the commerce clause issue in Chemehuevi, finding that
the incidence of the tax under California law fell on the Tribe,
not on the non-Indian purchaser. 222 This conclusion has been
summarily reversed by the Supreme Court.223 It therefore remains for the Ninth Circuit to deal with the issues left unresolved in its original opinion, including those raised by this article,224 and to correct the errors of the district court.
In addressing these issues, the Ninth Circuit will be unable
to avoid examination of the reserved power of the Indian commerce clause. The Supreme Court has specifically preserved the
clause for a special purpose: to prevent undue discrimination
222. 757 F.2d 1047, 1057 (9th Cir. 1985).
223. 106 S. Ct. 289 (1985) per curiam. The Court's summary disposition dealt only
with the issue of the legal incidence of the tax, and did not mention the commerce clause
issues. There were four dissents. Stevens, J. criticized the Court for taking it upon itself
to interpret the California statute, arguing that the Courts of Appeal are much more
adept at interpreting the law of the state in which they sit. [d. at 291 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He would have remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit for reconsideration pursuant to the Court's opinion. Id. Marshall, J. would have allowed argument on the case.
Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). Blackmun, J. would have given the case plenary consideration. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Brennan, J. would have denied certiorari. [d.
224. Timely appeal from the district court was taken on the commerce clause issues,
but the Ninth Circuit did not address them. 757 F.2d at 1057. Those issues are now
before the Ninth Circuit.
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against, or burdens on, Indian commerce. 2211 The clause becomes
particularly relevant in the Chemehuevi case, where an Indian
tribe has taken advantage of its geographical resources and created a commercial venture with the potential of rendering the
tribe economically self-sufficient. This potential exists only because of the efforts of the Tribe and the assistance of the federal
government. Here, the federal government has exercised its historical perogative under the Indian commerce clause in stimulating and regulating Indian commerce; an assertion of state authority must be viewed against any interference with the
accomplishment of this federal purpose. 226
The commerce clause analysis presented above is particularly well suited to deal with the issues that arise when a state
seeks to tax an Indian commercial enterprise operated under the
auspices of the federal government. It would be most appropriate for the Ninth Circuit to consider such an analysis, along with
the preemption and Indian sovereignty models, when it once
again addresses the Chemehuevi case. 227
225. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447
U.S. 134, 157 (1980). In fact, in a recent Ninth Circuit opinion, Queets Band of Indians
v. Wash., the court looked to the Indian commerce clause to determine the validity of a
state motor vehicle licensing requirement as applied to vehicles licensed by the tribe.
The divided court found that the licensing law placed only a minimal burden upon the
tribe, and did not unduly discriminate against the tribe in violation of the Indian commerce clause. 765 F.2d 1399, 1405 (9th Cir. 1985). The court went on to find that the
state law was preempted by the tribe's exercise of its own licensing power, as delegated
by the federal government. Id. at 1408-09. The Queets case was subsequently vacated
and withdrawn upon a joint motion of the parties due to pending legislative action. 783
F.2d 154 (9th Cir. 1986).
226. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 336 (1983).
227. As this article was going to press, the Ninth Circuit issued its opinion in
Squaxin Island Tribe v. Washington, 781 F.2d 715 (9th Cir. 1986). In that case, the
Ninth Circuit ruled that the State of Washington could regulate and tax tribal liquor
sales to non-Indians. Id. at 724. This case did not involve the commerce clause issues
raised in Chemehueui and discussed in this article, but applied the more common preemption and tribal sovereignty analyses.
The result may be distinguished from the Chemehueui case in two important ways.
One, this case involved liquor sales, and area where Congress has exercised its plenary
power and delegated regulatory authority to the states, by 18 U.S.C. § 1161. See Rice v.
Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983). Second, the district court in Squaxin Island Tribe found
that the value being marketed by the tribe was solely an exemption from state taxation.
Squaxin Island Tribe at 720. The Supreme Court ruled in Washington v. Confederated
Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980), that the marketing of a
tax exemption alone was insufficient to overcome otherwise valid state interests. Id. at
157. The Ninth Circuit therefore concluded that Washington's laws were not preempted
by federal law nor did they infringe upon the tribe's right of self-government. Squaxin
Island Tribe at 719-20 & nn. 6-7.
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LACEY ACT APPLIES TO INDIANS
I.

INTRODUCTION

In United States v. Sohappy,1 the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the convictions of thirteen Indian defendants for violating Lacey
Act 2 prohibitions against transporting, selling, or acquiring fish
taken or possessed in violation of Indian tribal law, or state law. s
Upholding the application of the Lacey Act, the court rejected
defendants' argument that application of the Act to Indian defendants who violated tribal law would amount to an abrogation
of the treaty reserved rights of the defendants' tribes to control
and regulate Indian fishing.
In the spring of 1982, in Cooks Landing, Washington and in
Celilo, Oregon, defendants caught and sold fish outside the seasons prescribed by tribal and state law, and sold ceremonial fish
in violation of other tribal and state regulations. 4 Defendants
were convicted under the Lacey Act and appealed, contending
that the Lacey Act prohibitions applied only to non-Indians,1I
that the government failed to prove that the offenses occurred
1. 770 F.2d 816 (9th Cir. 1985); (perChoy, J.; the other panel members were Anderson, J., and Tang, J.).
2. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-78 (1982).
3. 770 F.2d at 818.
4. Id. at 817.
5. Defendants contended that the Lacey Act prohibitions apply only to non-Indians
because federal prosecution of Indians for violations of tribal fishing law violates Indian
sovereignty and Indian treaty reserved fishing rights. Id.

245
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within Indian country, and that the trial judge improperly denied them a meaningful chance to challenge the validity of the
state regulations subsumed under the Lacey Act prosecutions. 6
II. BACKGROUND
The primary purpose in enacting the Lacey Act was to curb
trafficking in illegally acquired wildlife,' and to allow the federal
government to provide more adequate support for the full range
of laws that protect wildlife. 8 As such, the Act provides that it is
unlawful for any person to transport, sell, or acquire fish taken
in violation of Indian tribal law or state law. 9
The Act also explicitly disclaims any intention to repeal, supersede, or modify any right, privilege, or immunity reserved or
established pursuant to treaty pertaining to any Indian tribe. 10
Furthermore, the Act includes violations of tribal law only to the
extent that such offenses occur within Indian country.l1
The applicability of federal law to Indians on reservations
received attention from the Ninth Circuit in two recent cases. In
United States u. Jackson,12 the court addressed whether an Indian who hunted on his reservation in violation of a tribal ordinance could be prosecuted in federal court under a federal stat6. [d. at 817, 818. Also before the court, was the government's cross appeal from the
district judge's decision to grant a motion for a change of venue from Washington to Los
Angeles due to massive publicity and prejudice in Washington and Oregon against Indian treaty fisherman. Since the court affirmed the convictions, the cross appeal was not
addressed. [d. at 818.
7. [d. at 819.
8. [d. at 821 (quoting S. REP. No. 123, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1981) reprinted in
1981 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 1748, 1751).
9. 16 U.S.C. § 3372 provides:
It is unlawful for any person(1) to import, export, transport, sell, receive, acquire, or
purchase any fish or wildlife or plant taken or possessed in
violation of any ... Indian tribal law;
(2) to import, export, transport, sell, receive, acquire, or
purchase in interstate or foreign commerce(A) any fish or wildlife taken, possessed, transported, or
sold in violation of any law or regulation of any State ....
16 U.S.C. § 3372 (1982).
10. [d. § 3378(c)(2).
11. [d. § 3371(c).
12. 600 F.2d 1283 (9th Cir. 1979).
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ute prohibiting hunting on Indian reservations. 13 The Ninth
Circuit reversed and remanded for dismissal for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. 1" According to the court, the inherent sovereignty Indian tribes possessed over their internal affairs was
subject to congressional defeasance, but there was nothing in
the legislative history, nor any case law, to support the proposition that Congress intended that statute to apply to Indians on
their own reservations. 16
11)

In United States v. Farris,17 the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
conviction of Indians for the violation of gambling provisions in
the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. 16 According to the
Farris court, federal laws generally applicable throughout the
United States apply with equal force to Indians on reservations. 19 The court recognized the existence of three exceptions to
this rule: (1) where there is self-governance in purely intramural
affairs, (2) where a statute abrogated rights guaranteed by
treaty, and (3) where it could be proven that Congress did not
intend the law to apply to Indians. Appellants were found not to
be within any of those exceptions. 20
III. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
The court began its analysis of defendants' claim by focusing upon the issue of whether the Lacey Act prohibitions applied
to Indians as well as non-Indians. 21 This issue was accordingly
divided into two sub-parts: (1) whether the Indian tribes had a
treaty reserved right to exclusive jurisdiction over tribal law offenses committed by Indians; and (2) whether Congress intended all persons, including Indians, to be subject to the Lacey
13. Id. The statute at issue was 18 U.S.C. § 1165 (1982) which provided penalties for
"[w]hoever, without lawful authority or permission, willfully and knowingly goes upon
any land that belongs to any ... Indian tribe ... for the purpose of hunting . . . . " Id.
14. 600 F.2d at 1288.
15. Id. at 1285.
16. Id. at 1287.
17. 624 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1111 (1981).
18. 624 F.2d at 898. The statute involved was 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1982) which provided penalties for illegal gambling businesses.
19. 624 F.2d at 893.
20. Id. at 893, 894.
21. 770 F.2d at 818.
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Act prohibitions. 22

A.

TREATY RESERVED RIGHT TO EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION

The examination of defendants' assertion of a treaty reserved right to exclusive jurisdiction began with an attempt to
distinguish the present case from United States v. Jackson. 23
According to the court, under Jackson exclusive tribal jurisdiction was retained in offenses committed by one Indian against
another Indian.24 However, the present case involved an application of the Lacey Act to an offense committed by an Indian in
violation of both tribal law and state law. The court reasoned
that fishing offenses were not purely intra-Indian matters, but
impacted upon federal and state interests, including the interests of non-Indians, as well. Thus, Jackson did not support the
theory that the tribes retained by treaty exclusive jurisdiction
over Indians committing fishing offenses. 21i
Next, the court rejected defendants' claim that the exercise
of federal jurisdiction over Indians who violated their own tribal
law would effectively destroy tribal sovereignty as guaranteed by
treaty.2S While recognizing the importance of independent tribal
control, th'e court stated that "Indian sovereignty is necessarily
limited and must not conflict with the overriding sovereignty of
the United States."27 Furthermore, the exercise of federal jurisdiction under the Lacey Act was not disruptive of tribal authority, but supported tribal laws by authorizing federal penalties
for their violation. 28
Finally, the court concluded that Congress intended the
Lacey Act to apply to Indians. 29 Thus, the statutory language
disclaiming any intent to abrogate treaty rights could only be
reconciled with such an intention if there was no treaty right to
exclusive jurisdiction. 80
22.
23.
24.
25.

[d.
600 F.2d 1283 (9th CiT. 1979).
770 F.2d at 818.
[d. at 819.

26. [d.
27. [d. (citing United States v. Johnson, 637 F.2d 1224, 1230 (9th CiT. 1980)).

28. 770 F.2d at 819, 820.
29. [d. at 820.
30. [d.
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CONGRESSIONAL INTENT TO INCLUDE INDIANS

While the language of the Lacey Act prohibitions specifically refers to "any person," defendants contended that Congress meant to include only non-Indians. 31 According to the defendants, tribal law was' incorporated into the Act to provide a
mechanism for enforcement of tribal law against non-Indians. 32
However, the court found nothing in the legislative history to
support such a theory.33 Furthermore, the Act makes it unlawful
for "any person" to traffic not only in fish obtained in violation
of tribal law, but also in fish obtained in violation of federal and
state law as well. Yet, under defendants' theory, Indians would
be exempt from the prohibitions against trafficking in violation
of federal or state law, a result that would severely hinder the
goals set by Congress in enacting the Lacey Act. 34 According to
the court, the Act should apply to Indian offenders as well as to
non-Indians since Indians who traffic in illegal wildlife impede
the Lacey Act's goal of wildlife preservation just as much as
non-Indian traffickers. 311 Thus, the court concluded that given
the congressional goal of preserving wildlife, it was reasonable to
assume Congress intended the Lacey Act to encompass everyone, including Indians. 36
In addition to their claim that the Lacey Act prohibitions
did not apply to Indians, defendants also argued that the government failed to prove that their offenses occurred within Indian country, and that they were denied a meaningful chance to
challenge the validity of state regulations subsumed under the
Lacey Act. 3? Both claims were quickly rejected. The court found
that the government adequately demonstrated that Celilo and
Cooks Landing are within Indian country, since both areas are
owned by the United States and held for the benefit and use of
the various Columbia River treaty tribes. 38 The court also found
31. Id.
32. Id. at 821. It is generally recognized that Indian tribes do not have inherent
jurisdiction over non-Indians. See generally F. COHEN, HANDBOOK Or FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW, 246-57 (1982) (discussing the extent of tribal powers).
33. 770 F.2d at 821.
34.Id.
35.Id.
36.Id.
37. Id. at 822.
38.Id.
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that although the government had the burden of establishing
the validity of the state regulations underlying a Lacey Act prosecution, that burden had been met, as the government adequately established the validity of the 1982 spring season ban on
commercial fishing. 39
IV. CONCLUSION
In United States v. Sohappy, the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the convictions of Indian defendants for violating the Lacey
Act. 40 The court rejected defendants' argument that such a decision abrogated the treaty reserved right of their tribes to control
and regulate fishing. 41 While the court recognized the existence
of a treaty right to take fish at all usual and accustomed places,
it found no treaty reserved right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the enforcement of fishing laws against Indians. 42
In applying the Lacey Act to Indian defendants, the Ninth
Circuit has indicated that there are few instances when an Indian tribe will retain exclusive jurisdiction over its members.
The court has limited its holding in United States v. Jackson,
and embraced its position in United States v. Farris. Thus, the
court has subtly shifted its position from presuming tribal authority unless congressional intent clearly abrogates such authority, to presuming the applicability of federal law, unless
there is a specific treaty reserved right to exclusive jurisdiction.

Steven White*

39. [d. at 825.
40. [d.
41. [d. at 818.
42. [d. at 820.
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